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Abstract While mathematically impaired individuals
have been shown to have deficits in all kinds of basic
numerical representations, among them spatial-numerical
associations, little is known about individuals with excep-
tionally high math expertise. They might have a more
abstract magnitude representation or more flexible spatial
associations, so that no automatic left/small and right/large
spatial-numerical association is elicited. To pursue this
question, we examined the Spatial Numerical Association
of Response Codes (SNARC) effect in professional math-
ematicians which was compared to two control groups:
Professionals who use advanced math in their work but are
not mathematicians (mostly engineers), and matched con-
trols. Contrarily to both control groups, Mathematicians
did not reveal a SNARC effect. The group differences
could not be accounted for by differences in mean response
speed, response variance or intelligence or a general
tendency not to show spatial-numerical associations. We
propose that professional mathematicians possess more
abstract and/or spatially very flexible numerical represen-
tations and therefore do not exhibit or do have a largely
reduced default left-to-right spatial-numerical orientation
as indexed by the SNARC effect, but we also discuss other
possible accounts. We argue that this comparison with
professional mathematicians also tells us about the nature
of spatial-numerical associations in persons with much less
mathematical expertise or knowledge.
Introduction
The SNARC effect and possible underlying
mechanisms
Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (1993) found that in a
speeded bimanual decision task, participants responded
faster to small magnitude numbers with their left hand and
to large magnitude numbers with their right hand. The
acronym SNARC, Spatial-Numerical Association of
Response Codes, is used to label this phenomenon. Later
studies showed that this leftward bias towards small mag-
nitude numbers and rightward bias towards large magni-
tude numbers are not limited to bimanual responses and
extend to unimanual tasks, as well as to responding with
feet or eye movements (see Wood, Willmes, Nuerk, &
Fischer, 2008 for a review and meta-analysis; Gevers &
Lammertyn, 2005; see also Fischer & Shaki, 2014 for a
current overview).
The SNARC effect has been interpreted as providing
evidence that number magnitude representations are map-
ped spatially. Its presence is usually considered to be a
signature of automatic spatial processing of numerical
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magnitude. However, despite 20 years of extensive
research on the SNARC effect, there is no consensus about
the underlying mechanisms. Most popular explanations
refer to (1) cultural factors, in particular reading and
counting direction (see e.g., Zebian, 2005; Shaki, Fischer,
& Petrusic, 2009), (2) factors related to the spatial mapping
of numbers limited to the ongoing task (Ba¨chtold, Bau-
mu¨ller, & Brugger, 1998; Fischer, Mills, & Shaki, 2010),
(3) finger counting habits per se (Fischer, 2008), (4)
ordering of elements in working memory during a task (van
Dijck & Fias, 2011), (5) dichotomous verbal coding of
polar adjectives and mapping this code to spatial locations
(Gevers et al., 2010; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004;
Proctor & Cho, 2006), and (6) attentional factors (Nuerk,
Bauer, Krummenacher, Heller, & Willmes, 2005b). Some
of these factors (1–3) have been integrated in a recently
proposed theoretical framework about the embodiment of
numerical representations, showing how grounding,
embodiment, and situatedness influence the spatial repre-
sentations of numbers (Fischer & Brugger, 2011; Fischer,
2012; see also Wasner, Moeller, Fischer, & Nuerk, 2014).
While it is still not clear which of the above mechanisms
contribute to the SNARC effect, the observation that
numbers are somehow associated with spatial response
mappings has been replicated numerous times.
Interindividual differences in SNARC effect
Group and interindividual differences were also observed
for the SNARC effect with regard to some of the factors
just mentioned: For instance, in Western cultures, only
70 % participants reveal a left-to-right SNARC effect, but
30 % descriptively show the reverse (see Wood et al.,
2008; Cipora & Nuerk, 2013; Hoffmann, Pigat, & Schiltz,
2014a; Hoffmann, Mussolin, Martin, & Schiltz, 2014b).
SNARC also varies with individual reading habits, both in
general and in the experimental situation (Fischer, Shaki, &
Cruise, 2009). Moreover, individual finger counting habits
(Fischer, 2008; Lindemann, Alipour, & Fischer, 2011) and
some inhibition capacities influence the SNARC effect
(Hoffmann et al. 2014b). Other factors are age (meta-
analysis of Wood et al., 2008; Hoffmann et al., 2014b) and
sex (Bull, Cleland, & Mitchell, 2013). However, the dif-
ference is very small and its detection requires relatively
large groups (20 participants per group).
Recent evidence shows that the magnitude of the
SNARC effect is also related to mental rotation effects as
well as to numerical distance effects (Viarouge, Hubbard,
& McCandliss, 2014). The same study shows that partici-
pants revealing a strong mental rotation effect (i.e., larger
increase in RT with the increasing rotation angle) as well
as those who reveal a large distance effect (i.e., a larger
increase in RT when comparing numbers that are
numerically close than when comparing numbers that are
numerically distant) reveal a stronger SNARC effect. In
other words, participants whose spatial abilities are poorer
and who have a less precise number magnitude represen-
tation seem to associate number magnitude with space
more strongly. Finally, the SNARC effect has been linked
to arithmetic skills, but the findings are inconsistent (De-
haene et al., 1993; Fischer & Rottmann, 2005; Cipora &
Nuerk, 2013; Hoffmann et al., 2014a) and will be discussed
below in more detail.
Beyond such individual and group differences, individ-
ual response characteristics associated with the experiment
itself constitute the most robust factors influencing the
SNARC effect (Cipora & Nuerk, 2013; Gevers, Verguts,
Reynvoet, Caessens, & Fias, 2006; Wood et al., 2008, for a
meta-analysis). Longer responses and higher intraindivid-
ual variability in a parity judgement task are associated
with larger SNARC effects.
Nevertheless, although the SNARC effect was first
studied as a general cognitive effect, reflecting automatic
activation of spatial-numerical associations, individual
differences are ubiquitous and sometimes show that gen-
eral statements about spatial-numerical associations (par-
ticularly, the spatial mapping of number representations
and its directionality) must be further differentiated or even
occasionally reversed.
Is number magnitude representation always
associated with space?
Numerical representations can operate without a spatial
component. As shown by Helmreich et al. (2011) or Nunez,
Doan, and Nikoulina (2011), the spatial component of
magnitude representation is not obligatory. There is evi-
dence for an innate magnitude representation (showing
properties such as logarithmic compression), but its spatial
mapping seems to be mediated by cultural factors. Numer-
ical magnitude can in principle be processed semantically
without evoking a spatial-directional component (Nuerk
et al., 2005a, for data; see Patro, Nuerk, Cress, & Haman,
2014, for a model taxonomy and data from children).
Math expertise and elementary number processing:
different research perspectives
Because we are reporting on a study of (directional) spa-
tial-numerical associations in professional mathematicians,
we will give a short overview of what is known about
their specific characteristics as compared to controls.
Studies are rare, but overall they seem to imply that sim-
ilarities and differences between highly math-skilled par-
ticipants and the general population refer both to the
general personality and cognitive characteristics as well as
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to domain-specific factors like elementary number
processing.
Professional mathematical expertise refers to problem-
solving and logical-deductive thinking in highly abstract
spaces and structures (i.e., finding mathematical proofs or
counterexamples to theorems), but not necessarily to
arithmetic skills and calculation. In fact, Pesenti (2005)
showed systematically that successful mathematicians do
not have to be exceptional calculators.1 Skills of excep-
tional calculators are very often limited to arithmetic and
they are not capable of conducting mathematical proofs.
The first preliminary evidence for some unique abilities
in highly math-skilled individuals can be derived from
research and theoretical reasoning about cognitive devel-
opment, especially from Piagetian theory. Kuhn, Langer,
Kohlberg, and Haan (1977) observed that only 30 % of
adults reach the formal operation stage, which comprises
the ability to think about abstract concepts and to use
formal logic principles for reasoning, irrespective of the
content of problems to be solved. By definition, this ability
is fundamental and necessary for professional mathemat-
ics; therefore, all professional mathematicians should have
mastered formal operations. This already suggests that as a
population they are slightly different from the general
population. Fluid intelligence studies also corroborate this
assumption: Professional mathematicians are characterized
by above average intelligence; 50 % of the variance in
math achievement can be accounted for by fluid intelli-
gence (see e.g., Wei, Yuan, Chen, & Zhou, 2012). Com-
plex problem solving (CPS) skills (Sonnleitner, Keller,
Martin, & Brunner, 2013) usually measured with comput-
erized Microworld tasks may also be very relevant in
mathematical expertise. This set of abilities, such as rule
identification, rule knowledge, and rule application, can be
predictive of academic success and go beyond factors that
are assessed by traditional intelligence measures. These
higher order thinking skills correlate moderately with
intelligence as well as with math achievement and may
play a particular role in tasks that are performed by pro-
fessional mathematicians.
Arithmetic (but not necessarily mathematical, see
above) expertise was also a subject of direct investigation,
and studies conducted up to date can be classified into
several groups. First of all calculation prodigies were
examined (e.g., Fehr, Weber, Willmes, & Herrmann, 2010;
Fehr, Wallace, Erhard, & Herrmann, 2011; Pesenti, 2005
for comparison). The studies suggest that extraordinary
calculation skills mostly require drill and employ the same
neural circuits as in normal participants. On the other hand,
calculation prodigies are characterized by their excellent
working memory capacity (usually being restricted to the
numerical domain; Fehr et al., 2010; Pesenti, 2005). In
several cases, calculation prodigies were diagnosed with
autism or Asperger syndrome. Non-savant prodigies also
differ from the general population in several personality
traits (e.g., a calculation prodigy studied by Fehr et al.,
2010 had higher neuroticism, aggressiveness, conscien-
tiousness, and openness to experience than matched con-
trols). On the other hand, his general IQ was in the normal
up to moderately above normal range. In line with other
studies mentioned above, this seems to suggest once more
that high arithmetic skills are not necessarily linked to high
mathematical expertise.
More recent lines of research addressed relations
between mathematical/arithmetic expertise and elementary
numerical processing, but led to inconsistent results. The
most prominent scheme is to compare students of math-
related fields of study with students of humanities or social
sciences with respect to elementary numerical processing.
Such an attempt was made by Castronovo and Go¨bel
(2012), who showed that math-skilled participants do not
differ from their less-skilled peers in comparing non-
symbolic numerosities (sets of dots). However, skilled
participants outperformed controls in matching numbers to
non-symbolic numerosities as well as in comparing num-
bers. Wei et al. (2012) observed no relationship between
elementary number processing (comparison of dots of two
arrays; estimation of numerosity; number comparison; etc.)
and the ability to acquire advanced math concepts, but
measures of elementary numerical processing were corre-
lated with elementary math performance. Hanson and
Hogan (2000) show that estimation skills at the college age
correlate with the SAT mathematics score but not with the
SAT verbal score.
To summarize, the results are very inconsistent. Apart
from task differences, one reason may be that the above-
mentioned studies show differences in elementary number
processing depending on the arithmetic skill level
observed. Participants were students from different facul-
ties. These inclusion criteria do not guarantee a high level
of math expertise, because even in many science depart-
ments students are often more concerned with calculation
and application of formulae than with mathematical proofs.
Highly notable exceptions are two studies by Dowker
(1992) and Dowker, Flood, Griffiths, Harriss, and Hook
(1996), who examined professional mathematicians rang-
ing from postdocs to successful professors. Mathematicians
were asked to estimate the result of multi-digit multipli-
cations (which in fact is not considered a typical measure
of elementary numerical processing). In this arithmetic
task, they outperformed control groups consisting of
1 There are numerous anecdotal reports showing that outstanding
mathematicians (e.g., Stanisław Mazur, one of the most famous Polish
mathematicians) had difficulties with simple arithmetic in everyday
life.
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experienced accountants and psychologists. The reason
seemed to be that the mathematicians used a much wider
range of strategies for estimation. Professional mathe-
maticians were also more flexible in their strategy use
(when faced with the same problem after a few months
delay, they used novel strategies) and were less afraid of
making mistakes than controls. They reported feelings of
joy when playing with numbers. The authors concluded
that a mathematician’s work is based mostly on experi-
mentation when facing novel problems they have never
solved before (and without information of whether a given
problem has a solution).
Another line of evidence comes from introspective
reports of professional mathematicians. Penrose (1989)
claims that solving mathematical problems is not based
solely on using algorithms. The process of deciding which
algorithm should be applied plays a crucial role in most
cases.
Penrose also introspectively reports that a considerable
part of mathematical thinking takes the form of operations
on mental entities, which are sometimes hard to verbalize.
On the other hand, he reports that his colleagues think very
differently compared to him; so, there may be very high
interindividual variability in thinking in the group of pro-
fessional mathematicians.
To sum up, the demands of elaborating new ways of
facing and solving novel mathematical problems may
enhance the development of more flexible numerical rep-
resentations in professional mathematicians. It has not been
studied whether mathematicians are also different in basic
spatial-numerical associations.
The relation between arithmetic/mathematical skills
and SNARC
Because there are no data about professional mathemati-
cians, we will review the literature about the relation of
arithmetic/mathematical skills and the SNARC to derive
our hypothesis. Originally, participants who are more
advanced in math were thought to reveal a smaller SNARC
effect than those who were less proficient. The first evi-
dence came from Experiment 1 in the seminal study by
Dehaene et al. (1993). There was a non-significant ten-
dency that math-skilled participants (n = 10) revealed a
smaller SNARC effect than their non-skilled peers
(n = 10). The level of math skills was operationalized by
what field of study (science vs humanities, mostly litera-
ture; for a more thorough discussion of results of this
experiment refer to Cipora & Nuerk, 2013) was attended by
the participants. Despite its lack of significance, this result
was cited as an indication that math-skilled participants
reveal a smaller SNARC effect (e.g., Fischer et al., 2010;
Fischer & Rottmann, 2005). Fischer and Rottmann (2005)
again raised the issue of the relation between math skill and
the SNARC effect. Comparing two groups (10 participants
in each, grouping based on field of study: mathematics,
physics, engineering vs psychology), they found a numer-
ical tendency towards a difference, which again was far
from statistical significance (p = .28). Moreover, in a
study on the mental representation of fractions, Bonato,
Fabbri, Umilta`, and Zorzi, (2007) in Experiment 1 also
compared math-skilled and non-skilled participants (groups
of 10, students of engineering and psychology). In this
study, there was no difference between skilled and non-
skilled participants in the magnitude of the SNARC effect.
A similar result was reported in Experiment 4 of that study.
So, while there were some tendencies towards smaller
SNARC effect in math-skilled participants, they all
remained non-significant. However, all of the studies
mentioned above have some limitations affecting their
conclusiveness. First of all, the groups were very small,
which raises serious concerns about inferential statistical
power. Cipora and Wood (2012) showed that detecting
between-group differences in SNARC seems to be very
difficult and issues of statistical power have to be addressed
properly (increasing the number of repetitions of a single
stimulus, relatively large groups). Secondly, apart from the
study by Dehaene et al. (1993), the studies cited above used
modified versions of the typical parity judgment task.
Fischer and Rottmann (2005) included negative numbers in
their experiment (regarding the influence of the particular
number stimuli set on the SNARC effect see Dehaene
et al., 1993, Experiment 3, van Dijck & Fias, 2011). Bonato
et al. (2007) in their study used fractions that are processed
in a slightly different way than integers (Schneider &
Siegler, 2010). Therefore, a lack of between-group differ-
ences can possibly be accounted for by the unique nature of
the material used in a given study. Third, group inclusion
criteria were based on the field of study chosen. In case of
small groups, it is possible that there were several skilled
participants in the presumably non-skilled groups. There
was no external measure of math skill to control skill level.
Fourth, there was no theoretical background on what kind
of skill may be related to the SNARC effect (abstract
representations, calculation fluency, etc., see Cipora &
Nuerk, 2013 for discussion).
Fortunately, some recent studies have addressed one or
several of these points. Schneider, Grabner, and Paetsch
(2009) examined relations between basic signatures of
numerical processing and school achievement in 5th and 6th
grades. Besides other findings, they observed no relation-
ship between the SNARC effect and math achievement in a
large sample of more than 400 participants: There were no
significant correlations between the SNARC effect and
math grades, number line estimation accuracy, total score
for the numerical subscale in a standardized cognitive
Psychological Research (2016) 80:710–726 713
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abilities test (KFT), nor conceptual knowledge about math.
Moreover, there was an external criterion for math skill
(school achievement). However, this work was conducted
with children and because SNARC effects develop with age
(Berch, Foley, Hill, & Ryan, 1999; Wood et al., 2008), we
do not know whether these results will hold for adults.
Bull et al. (2013) conducted a study on gender differ-
ences in the SNARC effect. In Experiment 2, they tested 40
participants, twice as many as previous studies. The par-
ticipants performed a modified color discrimination task,
which was used to measure the SNARC effect. Math
competence was assessed by the Numerical Operations
subtest from the Wechsler Wide Achievement Test (WIAT
II, UK). In this study, virtually no relation between SNARC
and math ability was found (r = -.07). However, this study
might not be representative for SNARC effects, because the
authors used a non-semantic task, i.e., no judgement about
semantic attributes of numbers (e.g., parity) was required.
Very recently, two studies were published with adults
and featuring typical SNARC tasks and large samples,
thereby reducing power issues. Cipora and Nuerk (2013)
examined 71 participants comparing students studying
math-related subjects (math, computer studies, engineer-
ing, etc.; n = 18) and those studying subjects in which
math is not crucial (psychology, literature etc.; n = 53).
The mean age of participants was below 22 years old;
therefore, they were mostly at the beginning of their
studies. Despite the relatively large sample sizes and
extensive efforts to control power and reliability issues,
there was no relationship between arithmetic skill nor field
of study with the magnitude of the SNARC effect. Nev-
ertheless, their sample was not gender balanced and pro-
portions of males and females differed between skill
groups. Furthermore, the presumably skilled group com-
prised far fewer participants than the presumably non-
skilled group. Hoffmann et al. (2014a) also tested a large
group (n = 95) comprised 3 groups of university students:
(1) ‘‘Math expert’’ refers to students ‘‘with a study field
having a strong numerical load (e.g., mathematics, engi-
neering, and sciences),’’ (2) controls, and (3) a math dif-
ficulties group. Again, participants were students (mean
age 23.2 years) and no professional mathematicians. In
contrast to Cipora and Nuerk (2013), a between-group
difference was observed, but its effect size was small
(partial g2 = 0.05). Nevertheless, considerable differences
in design, especially the inclusion of zero in the stimulus
set (for a specific role of zero see: Nuerk et al., 2004), do
not allow for direct comparison with the study by Cipora &
Nuerk (2013). However, in the Hoffmann et al. (2014a)
study, the between-group difference in the SNARC effect
remained, when 0 and 5 were excluded from the analyses:
the highly skilled math group still differed significantly
from the controls. The correlation between the SNARC
slope and arithmetic even remained when the math diffi-
culties group was excluded from their analyses. When
these analyses are considered, some substantial differences
between the results of both studies remain.
In sum, 6 out of 7 studies (Bonato et al., 2007; Bull
et al., 2013; Cipora & Nuerk, 2013; Dehaene et al., 1993;
Fischer & Rottmann, 2005; Schneider et al., 2009)
observed no significant relation between SNARC and
arithmetic competence (directly assessed or indirectly via
field of study), while one recent study (Hoffmann et al.,
2014a) observed a significant, albeit small relation. None
of these SNARC studies used professional mathematicians
as studies examining other questions had done (Dowker,
1992; Dowker et al., 1996).
Objectives of the presented study
As we have argued in the previous sections, the origin of
interindividual differences in the SNARC effect is largely
unknown even after over 20 years of research. Throughout
these years, the math skill level was one of the most
interesting factors to be taken into consideration. Since it
seemed to be difficult to find a relation between SNARC
slopes and arithmetic skill in the typical skill range, the
next step is to examine extreme groups. This is the
approach we are taking in this study.
Because Hoffmann et al. (2014a) had already studied
participants with math difficulties, we now decided to
explore the SNARC effect at the other end of the spectrum,
i.e., in professional math experts. We not only used math
students (who have not finished their studies, and whose
math expertise may or may not be so good), nor did we
stop at examining participants with a math B.Sc. or M.Sc.
degree. Rather, we used advanced Ph.D. students, who
were researching mathematics as part of their daily life and
who had done so for at least 3 years. In this way, we
ensured a level of professional math experience, which has
very rarely (see Dowker, 1992) been studied in any
numerical cognition work. Examining expert mathemati-
cians seems promising because one can expect that possi-
ble differences will be more pronounced than in case of
typical skill levels for several reasons. First, professional
mathematicians are required to manipulate abstract con-
cepts in several ways in order to solve problems. Therefore,
they might have a more abstract concept of numbers than
typical people and might not automatically associate
numbers with space. Second, mathematicians are experi-
enced in mapping numbers and mathematical concepts to
space in a very flexible and variable way. Therefore, they
might exhibit spatial associations with numbers but these
associations may not be consistent with a given cultural
convention. Rather their space-number associations might
be highly flexible, corresponding to the flexible use of
714 Psychological Research (2016) 80:710–726
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space number relations in their professional work. Both
accounts would predict a smaller or a null default spatial-
numerical association in mathematicians.
Moreover, we decided to distinguish professional
mathematicians from professionals in other fields (e.g.,
engineering), who use advanced arithmetic in their work
but are either not interested in the study of mathematics
itself or at least less so. Usually, groups employing true
mathematics (working on theorems) and groups applying
advanced mathematics for arithmetic are not distinguished
and this will also be done here. Finally, we also used a
professional control group from social sciences and
humanities, who have even less experience with numbers.
In order to ensure the reliable estimation of the SNARC
effect and to obtain optimal power to detect a SNARC
effect, as well as individual differences in SNARC, we
utilized a procedure involving many more repetitions of
each number/condition (see Cipora & Nuerk, 2013; Cipora
& Wood, 2012). This seems particularly important since
recent evidence shows that the reliability of SNARC slopes
obtained in a typical setup is rather poor (correlations of
slopes\0.4; Viarouge et al., 2014; see also Wood, Nuerk,
& Willmes, 2006), and hence probably reduces correlations
with external measures. It is particularly noteworthy that
reliability problems are not limited to the SNARC effect
but are present in other chronometric measures as well
(e.g., Maloney, Risko, Preston, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2010,
for the numerical distance effect). For these reasons,
increasing the number of repetitions is crucial when RT
difference scores are calculated (see Miller & Ulrich, 2013;
for a theoretical account and some simulations). Addi-
tionally, we decided to control for fluid intelligence to
ensure that any relationship between mathematical exper-
tise and the SNARC effect was not due to related differ-
ences in fluid intelligence. When addressing the possible
influences of intelligence on spatial-numerical associations,
we decided to utilize a measure of fluid intelligence,
namely Advanced Raven Matrices. We were especially
interested in nonverbal abilities and reasoning skills for
nonverbal material. Moreover, aiming at studying highly
educated participants, we had to choose a measure capable
of differentiating participants at highly above-average
levels of fluid intelligence and avoiding ceiling effects.
Among the measures of fluid intelligence available in
Polish, only the Advanced Raven Matrices are suited to
assess fluid intelligence at levels, which are far above
average. Unfortunately, there is no Polish adaptation of the
Raven Vocabulary Scales designed to complement the
matrices. Time constraints also did not allow us to utilize
other intelligence measures.
To ensure that we were really looking at differences
regarding the association between number magnitude and
space and not only at general differences of numerical
effect sizes between groups, we also explored a related, yet
different effect, the Linguistic Markedness Association of
Response Codes (MARC) effect. The MARC effect was
assumed to be driven by linguistic properties (namely lin-
guistic markedness) of number attributes (Nuerk et al.,
2004; for a current overview and theoretical frameworks
for MARC effect see Huber et al., 2014b).
If a systematic relation between SNARC and profes-
sional math expertise exists, math professionals should
show a smaller or a null SNARC effect (as some studies
indicated descriptively smaller SNARC effects in groups
partially consisting of math students). If this relation does
not differ between individuals at all, no group differences
should be observed. Any conclusive group difference
should not be explained by control variables like intelli-
gence and overall mean RT or RT variability, and it should
be specific to the SNARC effect.
Methods
Participants
44 participants (6 female) took part in the study. The mean
age was 27.9 years (SD = 1.1; range 26–31 years). All
participants (native Polish speakers) were doctoral students
(third year or higher). The inclusion criterion for our
sample was to be advanced in doctoral studies, so that the
exact dissertation topic has been officially approved by the
department’s council. Participants constituted three groups:
(1) mathematicians (M; n = 14, 2 females)—doctoral
students in mathematics; (2) engineers (E; n = 15, 2
females)—doctoral students in other fields who are not
professional mathematicians but use advanced math in
their work (e.g., communication, chemistry, etc.); and (3)
controls (C; n = 15; 2 females)—doctoral students in the
humanities and social sciences (e.g., philosophy, sociology,
psychology, etc.)2. The groups did not differ with respect to
age (M = 28.2; E = 28.1; C = 27.5 years). All partici-
pants were right handed (due to requirements for a subse-
quent fMRI study—not reported here) and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials
A computerized parity judgment task was utilized. Partici-
pants were asked to decide on the parity of numbers pre-
sented on the screen using the P and Q keys on a standard
computer keyboard. Both speed and accuracy were stressed.
2 We did not include physicists to any group because in many cases
their work mostly comprises mathematics but on the other hand is not
mathematics per se.
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The task comprised two blocks with response key mapping
reversed. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across
participants. Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were used.
Black stimuli (font size 30) were presented against light
gray background (210 210 210 in RGB notation) to avoid
sharp contrasts. Each number was presented 30 times within
each block. Each block was preceded by a training session
(16 trials) to familiarize participants with the task. During
the training session, accuracy feedback was provided and
the required response mapping was indicated in the bottom
line of the screen. The order of trials was randomized with
the restriction that each number could not appear more than
two times in a row.
Each trial started with an eye fixation cross presented for
300 ms. Subsequently, the number appeared and was pre-
sented until the participants responded or for a maximum
duration of 2 s. The next trial started after 500 ms.
A standard, portable, MS Windows compatible com-
puter (15.4 in.) running DMDX software (Forster & For-
ster, 2003) was used to present stimuli and collect
responses. We also administered Advanced Raven Matri-
ces (see Raven, Court, & Raven, 1983, Polish adaptation
by Jaworowska & Szustrowa, 1991) in order to control for
fluid intelligence.
Procedure
The parity judgment task was performed as a first task
before an fMRI experiment, which was not related to the
SNARC effect (and is not reported here). Participants were
tested individually. After informed consent had been
obtained, participants were seated in front of the computer
and asked to read the instructions carefully. All questions
were answered if needed. The parity judgment task lasted
about 12 min. After completion of the fMRI study, par-
ticipants solved the Advanced Raven Matrices, results of
which were used as a covariate in the present study. Series
1 was administered first in a separate booklet in order to
familiarize the participants with the test. The time limit for
series 1 was 5 min and the score was not analyzed further.
Subsequently, participants were assessed with series 2. The
time limit was 20 min.
Data preparation
Data from training series was not analyzed. The average
error rate was 3.1 %, but errors were not analyzed further.
Reaction times (RTs) shorter than 200 ms (less than
0.01 % of trials) were treated as anticipations and dis-
carded from further analyses. To solve the problem of
outlier RTs, a sequential filtering procedure was applied.
Mean RTs, as well as standard deviations, were calculated
for each participant separately. Subsequently, RTs outside
±3 SD from a participant’s mean were discarded. Means
and SDs were calculated again and this procedure was
repeated until there were no more changes in mean and SD.
91.9 % of the data were retained after filtering and were
then analyzed further (see also Cipora & Nuerk, 2013, for
the same trimming method).
SNARC effect calculation
In order to calculate the SNARC effect, the method proposed
by Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, and d’Ydewalle (1996) was
used. It enables the calculation of the magnitude of the
SNARC for each participant and produces a single numerical
value, which is suitable for further comparisons. First, dRT
(RT right hand - RT left hand) is calculated for each number
for each participant separately. Positive dRT values indicate
left-hand advantage, whereas negative dRT values indicate
right-hand advantage. Subsequently, dRT values are regres-
sed on number magnitude. Non-standardized regression
slopes are taken as a measure of the SNARC effect. A more
negative slope corresponds to a stronger SNARC effect. To
examine whether there is a significant SNARC effect at the
sample level, slopes are tested against zero with the one-
sample t test. Since there is direct prediction regarding
directionality of the SNARC effect, one-sided test for negative
values can be used. This method is the most popular in the
literature, so that we decided to use it as a primary measure.
Additionally, we calculated multiple regressions within each
participant with two predictors—number parity and magni-
tude—such that apart from the SNARC effect we were cap-
able of estimating the MARC effect (right-hand advantage for
even numbers and left-hand advantage for odd numbers;
Nuerk et al., 2004; Nuerk, Wood, & Willmes, 2005a). This
also allowed us to examine the individual fit of the regression
model (R2) and the size of residuals.
Using the non-standardized regression slope as a mea-
sure of the SNARC effect size has been strongly criticized
recently (Pinhas, Tzelgov, & Ganor-Stern, 2012). The non-
standardized slope does not carry information regarding the
fit of the regression slope to the data. According to this
view, it cannot serve as a measure of SNARC effect size.
Hoffmann et al. (2014a) proposed an alternative solution
by calculating the within-participant Pearson correlation
between dRT and number magnitude as a univariate mea-
sure of the SNARC effect. This method was also applied
here. These correlation coefficients were then Fisher-Z
transformed to bring their distribution closer to a normal
distribution for further statistical comparisons (this mea-
sure is further referred to as standardized slope). Note that
these standardized slopes (before Fisher-Z transformation)
are numerically equivalent to standardized regression
slopes from the univariate regression analysis used for
calculating non-standardized intraindividual slopes.




In a first step, we estimated the reliability of the measures
we included in our analyses. Reliable measurement is a
prerequisite for the meaningful interpretation of our cor-
relation analyses of chronometric measures (cf. Maloney
et al., 2010; Miller & Ulrich, 2013). In case of mean RT,
SD of RT, SNARC slopes, and standardized slopes, the
split-half method (odd–even) was applied. Subsequently,
we applied the Spearman-Brown adjustment to obtain the
reliability estimate for the whole set of items. Regarding
Advanced Raven Matrices, we also decided to estimate
reliability, using Cronbach’s alpha, since the psychometric
evaluation of the Polish adaptation did not comprise such
specific groups as our mathematicians and engineering
groups. All reliability estimates were highly satisfactory
and allowed for a subsequent interpretability of correlation
coefficients (see Table 1).
Reaction time characteristics
Mean reaction time was 533 ms. Mean intraindividual SD
of RT was 97 ms. Cipora and Nuerk (2013) showed that
intraindividual variability in response latencies correlates
with the magnitude of the SNARC effect. Neither mean RT
nor intraindividual RT variability differed between groups
(both F values\1). For RT, the group means were math-
ematicians (M) = 515 ms, engineers (E) = 550 ms, con-
trols (C) = 532 ms, whereas for intraindividual variability
the means were M = 94 ms, E = 97 ms, C = 101 ms.
Fluid intelligence
For one participant, the score for the Advanced Raven
Matrices was not available (because of technical problems
during fMRI scanning preceding administration of the
Raven test). Mean score in the Advanced Raven matrices
was 27.5 (SD = 4.88). Scores for the three groups were
M = 30.93 (SD = 4.75), E = 26.57 (SD = 4.27),
C = 25.27 (SD = 3.94). The between-group mean differ-
ence was significant F2,40 = 6.73, MSE = 18.68,
p = .003, partial g2 = 0.25. Follow-up t tests indicated
higher fluid intelligence in professional mathematicians
compared to the other two groups taken together
(mean = 25.90, SD = 4.08) t41 = 3.59; p = .001. More
conservative post hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni-Holm
correction) revealed significant differences between the
M and the C group (p = .003) as well as the M and the
E group (p = .022). The difference between the E and the
C group was not significant (p = .421). All these results
indicate higher fluid intelligence in professional mathe-
maticians compared to the other groups.
SNARC slopes
As expected, we found a significant SNARC effect at the
whole sample level. Mean slope was -5.06 (SD = 7.20;
ranging from -25.58 to 12.92), and it differed significantly
from 0 (t43 = -4.66, p\ .001; one-sided)
3. A total of 35
out of the 44 participants revealed negative SNARC slopes.
In the next step, we compared slopes across groups
using one-factor ANOVA. Groups differed significantly in
the magnitude of the SNARC effect (F2,41 = 3.65,
MSE = 46.19, p = .035, partial g2 = 0.15). To examine
whether the SNARC effect varied as a function of math
expertise, we carried out the nonparametric Jonckheere-
Terpstra (JT) test, which examines whether group medians
increase monotonically. The JT test was chosen because we
had a specific expectation regarding an ordered sequence of
group SNARC slope medians decreasing with math
expertise. We did not use polynomial contrasts (e.g., lin-
ear), because they assume equidistant differences between
groups and we cannot be sure about that, but only about
monotonic ordinal differences in skill and experience. The
JT test revealed a significant decrease in slope with the
increasing math expertise (p = .018). Note that less neg-
ative slopes refer to smaller SNARC/no SNARC. Addi-
tionally, we performed post hoc pairwise comparisons
(with Bonferroni-Holm correction), which indicated that
the M group differed significantly from the C group
(p = .030). The E group did not differ from the M group
(p = .210) or from the C group (p = .300).
In order to investigate whether non-significant differ-
ences between the E and C as well as the M and E groups
were due to lack of statistical power, a Bayesian analysis as
recommended by Masson (2011) was performed (see
Table 1 Reliability estimates of fluid intelligence, RT characteris-




Raven score 0.833 Cronbach alpha
Mean RT 0.996 Split-half, Spearman-
Brown










3 Note that results are virtually the same in all instances if two-sided
tests are applied except from MARC effect in the C group.
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Cipora & Nuerk, 2013, for a similar application as regards
the SNARC effect). This analysis provides information
whether the data support the null hypothesis model (no
between-group difference) or the alternative hypothesis
model (between-group difference). Separate univariate
ANOVAs were conducted in order to compare the E with
the M as well as the C with the E group. Sums of squares
were used to calculate posterior probabilities. In case of
comparing the C with the E group, the analysis shows 0.67
probability in favor of the null hypothesis model (and a
complimentary 0.33 probability in favor of the alternative
hypothesis). The comparison of the E group with the
M group revealed 0.65 probability in favor of the null
hypothesis model (and a complimentary 0.35 probability in
favor of the alternative hypothesis). According to guideli-
nes proposed by Masson (2011), these results can be
interpreted as weak evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
in both cases, providing evidence against the claim that the
null results simply originate from power problems.
Subsequently, we examined the presence of the SNARC
effect in each group. Non-standardized slopes for each
group are presented in Fig. 1. Crucially, there was no
significant SNARC effect in the M group. Mean slope was
-1.66 (SD = 5.93; ranging from -9.35 to 12.92)
t13 = -1.05, p = .157 (one-sided). 9 out of 14 participants
revealed a negative SNARC slope. In contrast, a significant
SNARC effect was found in the E group (t14 = -3.12;
p = .004; one-sided). Mean slope was -4.82 (SD = 6.0;
ranging from -17.07 to 0.57). 13 out of 15 participants
revealed negative slopes. Similarly, there was a significant
SNARC effect in the C group (t14 = -4.01, p\ .001; one-
sided). Mean slope was -8.46 (SD = 8.17; ranging from
-25.57 to 4.27). 13 out of 15 participants revealed nega-
tive slopes.
Subsequently, we tested for variance homogeneity
across groups with the Bartlett test. The analysis revealed
that there was no significant difference in variance between
groups (K2 = 1.86; df = 2; p = .394). Group differences
and null SNARC effects can thus not be attributed to more
heterogeneity in the mathematicians group. Nevertheless,
the exact tests for 2 9 2 tables did not reveal significant
between-group differences in proportions of participants
revealing negative slopes (p’s[ .230).
Correlates of the SNARC effect
In the next step, we aimed at testing whether the size of the
SNARC effect correlated with other measures used in our
study. All correlations are presented in Table 2.
Although numerically larger than zero, the correlation of
the individual SNARC effect slope with mean RT failed to
reach significance. However, as in Cipora and Nuerk








































Fig. 1 dRT and non-standardized SNARC slopes presented for each
group separately. Slopes differ significantly from 0 only for the
C (control) and E (engineers) groups but not for the M (mathemati-
cians) group
Table 2 Correlation between measures of the SNARC effect (non-standardized slopes, standardized slopes, multiple regression results), par-
ticipants’ RT characteristics, and Advanced Raven matrices total score
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Non-standardized SNARC slope –
Mean RT -0.26
SD (RT) -0.40** 0.82**
Standardized SNARC Slope 0.79** 0.07 -0.02
Multiple regression R2 -0.24 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12
Multiple regression—residual -0.33* 0.64** 0.77** -0.06 -0.33**
Multiple regression—magnitude (SNARC) 1.0** -0.26 -0.40** 0.79** -0.24 -0.33*
Multiple regression—parity (MARC) 0.18 0.10 -0.01 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.18
Raven 0.25 -0.36* -0.49** 0.11 -0.04 -0.44** 0.25 0.18
* p\ .05, ** p\ .01 (two-sided)
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variability in RT. It is noteworthy that there was no cor-
relation between the SNARC effect and the Advanced
Raven Matrices score. Finally, for a full overview, corre-
lations for each single group are separately presented in the
‘‘Appendix’’.
Further investigation of between-group differences
in SNARC
Having explored the correlations between the SNARC
effect and several other measures, we aimed at checking
whether between-group differences in SNARC hold, when
controlling for possible covariates. There was a significant
bivariate correlation between SNARC slopes and
intradindvidual variability in response times. Therefore, we
conducted analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to investi-
gate, whether between-group differences in SNARC slopes
still hold, when we control for this variable (see Tabach-
nick & Fidell, 2007; pp. 196–203 for rationale and rec-
ommendations regarding use of ANCOVA).
The main effect of the group remained when we con-
trolled for intraindividual variability in RT (F2, 40 = 3.51;
MSE = 39.71; p = .040, partial g2 = 0.15). The effect of
the covariate intraindividual variability in RT on the
dependent variable SNARC slope was also significant
(F1,40 = 7.69; p = .008; partial g
2 = 0.16). Pairwise
between-group comparisons with Bonferroni-Holm cor-
rection revealed a significant difference between the M and
the C group (p = .036), when controlling for intraindi-
vidual variability in RT.
We also conducted an ANCOVA controlling for the
potential impact of fluid intelligence on the dependent
variable. In that analysis, the main effect of group failed to
reach significance (F2,39 = 2.21; MSE = 47.93; p = .124,
partial g2 = 0.102). The effect of fluid intelligence was not
significant as well (F1,39 = 0.22; p = .639, partial
g2 = 0.006). This result must be treated with great caution,
because it is very likely that in our quasi-experimental
design the differences in fluid intelligence are associated
with group assignment (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007;
p. 200). We want to stress that this ANCOVA result is not
conclusive and should normally not be conducted because
assumptions for a meaningful interpretation of the covariate
effect are violated: (1) there is no correlation between
SNARC slopes and fluid intelligence at the whole sample
level; and (2) there is no such correlation in any group. We
will elaborate on this point in the ‘‘Discussion’’ section.
SNARC and MARC effects: calculation using
multiple regression approach
To examine a potential MARC effect (i.e., right-hand
advantage for even numbers and left-hand advantage for
odd numbers) together with the SNARC effect, individual
multiple regressions were run on dRT (see Nuerk et al.,
2005a, b, for the rationale). Odd numbers were coded as 0
and even numbers as 1. Non-standardized slopes were used
for further analyses. In case of the magnitude predictor, the
mean slope was -5.05 (SD = 7.20) and differed signifi-
cantly from 0 (t44 = -4.66, p\ .001; one-sided). Hence-
forth, even when controlling for parity, a significant
SNARC effect was observed. The parity slope
(mean = -22.43, SD = 66.97) also differed significantly
from 0 (t43 = -2.22, p = .016; one-sided) revealing a
significant MARC effect. Subsequently, SNARC and
MARC slopes were examined (tested against 0) within
each group. The results are summarized in Table 3. The
results regarding the SNARC effect are very similar to
those obtained for the one-predictor regression (described
above). There was a significant SNARC effect in the E and
the C group but there was no SNARC in the M group.
Although the overall MARC effect over all groups was
significant, the MARC effect reached significance only in the
C group, probably due to power problems. In the next step,
we compared groups with respect to the size of the SNARC
and MARC effects. In case of the SNARC effect, there was a
significant between-group difference, which is almost
identical to the results of the ANOVA on slopes from the
simple regression. In case of the MARC effect, there was no
significant between-group difference (F2,41 = 0.95, MSE =
4495.06, p = .394, partial g2 = 0.04).
Standardized SNARC slopes
In the last step of the analysis, we examined standard-
ized SNARC slopes (i.e., within-participants Pearson
Table 3 SNARC and MARC
effect estimates based on a
multiple regression analysis
across all three groups taken
together
Group Non-standardized SNARC slope Non-standardized MARC effect
Mean SD Test against 0 Mean SD Test against 0
M -1.66 5.92 t13 = -1.05, p = .157 -4.80 57.97 t13 = -0.31, p = .381
E -4.82 5.99 t14 = -3.12, p = .004 -22.11 57.13 t14 = -1.50, p = .078
C -8.46 8.17 t14 = -4.01, p\ .001 -39.21 82.34 t14 = -1.84, p = .043
Slopes were tested against 0 with one-sample t tests (one-sided, for negative values), results of which are
also presented in the table
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correlation between number magnitude and dRT). Stan-
dardized slopes were Fisher-Z transformed prior to the
analysis, so that they followed better a normal distribution.
At the group level, we found a significant SNARC
effect (t43 = -4.32, p\ .001). The mean was -0.36
(SD = 0.55). Analysis in groups taken separately revealed
an analogous pattern of results as for the analyses on non-
standardized slopes. There was no SNARC in the M group
(t13 = -0.80, p = .438) with a mean slope of -0.15
(SD = 0.68). Contrarily there was a significant SNARC
effect in the E group (t14 = -3.14, p = .008, mean slope
-0.37, SD = 0.46) and the C group (t14 = -4.70,
p\ .001, mean slope -0.54, SD = 0.45). There were no
significant between-group differences in standardized
SNARC slopes (F2,41 = 1.97, MSE = 0.29, p = .153,
partial g2 = 0.09).
Discussion
In the presented paper, we aimed at investigating the
relation between the SNARC effect and mathematical
proficiency including a group of professional mathemati-
cians. We recruited three groups of participants, profes-
sional mathematicians; professionals who use arithmetic in
their everyday work, but who do not conduct research
using mathematical reasoning itself; and controls, who are
not or hardly ever required to use math in their everyday
work.
Most importantly, in contrast to most previous studies,
we found a significant between-group difference with
respect to the SNARC effect, which was mainly driven by
the professional mathematicians, whose SNARC effects
have—to the best of our knowledge—never been studied
before. Professional mathematicians did not reveal a sig-
nificant SNARC effect, while the other two groups did.
Professional mathematicians significantly differed from the
other two control groups, while those two control groups
with more or less arithmetic expertise did not differ from
each other; this replicates earlier results of most studies
before. This difference between mathematicians and con-
trol groups still held when various covariates were con-
trolled for, such as RT characteristics (mean RT as well as
intraindividual variability in RT). Within groups, fluid
intelligence did not correlate with the SNARC, so that
between-group differences in fluid intelligence cannot
explain the SNARC effect, because if fluid intelligence
determines the SNARC effect, it should do so within
groups as well. The correlation at the sample level between
fluid intelligence and SNARC was also not significant. The
ANCOVA results controlling for fluid intelligence brought
inconsistent findings, nevertheless they must be interpreted
with great caution because ANCOVA assumptions were
strongly violated (e.g., the covariate was not independent
from the factor underlying group assignment) and the
sample size was relatively small. In similar cases, several
authors refrained from ANCOVA usage, when there is no
zero-order correlation between a potential covariate and the
dependent variable (e.g. Go¨bel, Moeller, Pixner, Kauf-
mann, & Nuerk, 2013).
The results also did not change substantially, when
alternative methods of computing SNARC effects were
used. We found the same pattern of results when magnitude
slopes from multiple regression (i.e., controlling for the
MARC effect) were analyzed. When we analyzed stan-
dardized SNARC slopes, the general pattern of results was
similar: namely when compared to 0, professional mathe-
maticians did not reveal a significant SNARC effect
(contrary to the E and C groups). A notable difference
between the analyses using non-standardized vs standard-
ized slopes is that in the latter the between-group difference
failed to reach significance. Standardized SNARC slopes
consider the intraindividual variability within a subject,
especially, how much dRT points are dispersed around the
regression slope. So in principle the non-standardized
regression slope could be almost 0; however, when all data
points would be located almost exactly on the regression
slope, the standardized slope would be very high. In
essence, it is an index for how good the prediction of
space-number associations by number magnitude is.
However, it does not tell us much about how pronounced
this association is. This is coded by the non-standardized
slope, which reveals how many milliseconds faster a con-
gruent spatial response is. In our data, the most likely
explanation for the slight differences are high intraindi-
vidual variances in some participants. If those participants
have high non-standardized SNARC slopes (e.g., in the
C group), their non-standardized slopes might differ con-
siderably from other groups but their predictions indexed
by the standardized slopes might only be slightly different
because they are corrected for their higher intraindividual
variability.
Apart from group differences, the SNARC effect was
related to response time characteristics (mean RT and
intraindividual variability in RT). Nevertheless, this cor-
relation was present only when non-standardized SNARC
slopes were analyzed. The relation between SNARC and
RT characteristics may therefore just be an artifact origi-
nating from a difference measure (i.e., dRT being the result
of subtracting two RT) used to calculate SNARC (see
Tzelgov, Zohar-Shai, & Nuerk, 2013, for a methodological
critique of using non-standardized SNARC slopes). In the
model proposed by Gevers et al. (2006), the relationship
between mean RT and SNARC is explained in terms of the
cognitive mechanisms underlying the SNARC effect. As
we have shown (and as already pointed out in Pinhas et al.,
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2012; Tzelgov et al., 2013), this relationship may largely
originate from the way slopes are calculated, not from the
nature of the SNARC effect itself. Therefore, it seems that
the relationship between SNARC and mean RT (as well as
variability in RT) may not be a consequence of the cog-
nitive processes underlying the SNARC effect (e.g., Gevers
et al., 2006), but depend on the measure employed. As
outlined above, fluid intelligence (Raven Matrices) scores
differed between the M group and the other two control
groups. Nevertheless, fluid intelligence did not correlate
with SNARC slopes nor standardized SNARC slopes; so
individual and group differences in SNARC are not driven
by fluid intelligence. However, fluid intelligence correlated
moderately with RT characteristics. This observation is in
line with the results showing a correlation between intel-
ligence and chronometric tasks in general (Deary, Der, &
Ford, 2001).
For the linguistic MARC effect, the different groups did
not differ from one another. The MARC effect did not
correlate with any other measure. Thus, diverging effects
for professional mathematicians were specific to the
SNARC effect per se and could not be generalized to
another effect in the study.
In sum, professional mathematicians differed in the
SNARC effect from the control groups in virtually all
analyses. This group difference could not be explained by
different RT characteristics or fluid intelligence. It was
specific to the SNARC effect, but did not generalize to the
MARC effect. Between the two non-professional mathe-
maticians groups, no significant differences in the SNARC
effect were observed, despite strong differences in daily
arithmetic experience. This replicates earlier results (e.g.,
Cipora & Nuerk, 2013). SNARC effects do not seem to
vary (much) with arithmetic proficiency in the normal
range. Only when relatively large (n[ 35), gender-bal-
anced samples are examined, one may expect to have
significant statistical test results for relatively small effects
(Hoffmann et al., 2014b). The probability of finding a
relationship between math proficiency and the SNARC
effect increases when extreme groups are recruited (pro-
fessional mathematicians vs people with math difficulties,
as in Hoffmann et al., 2014b).
Reasons for the small or non-significant SNARC vari-
ations with arithmetic proficiency have been discussed in
detail elsewhere (e.g., Cipora & Nuerk, 2013, see also
Patro et al., 2014; for different spatial-numerical associa-
tions, which may be differently related to arithmetic pro-
ficiency in children). Therefore, we only focus on why the
SNARC effect in professional mathematicians is signifi-
cantly weaker than in other groups and not significantly
different from zero. Note, however, that in our study 9 out
of 14 (64 %) mathematicians revealed negative SNARC
slopes. The slopes were not significantly different from
zero. Given the relatively small sample size, it is still
possible that this non-significant result is due to power
problems.
Reasons for lack of/significantly reduced SNARC
in professional mathematicians
There may be several reasons for a null or significantly
reduced SNARC effect in mathematicians. Here we focus
on possible differences in (1) domain-general cognitive
abilities, (2) the nature of number representations, and (3)
the embodied cognition perspective.
Inhibition and/or cognitive control capabilities Tasks
measuring the SNARC effect are at some point influenced
by inhibition processes. In incongruent trials (a smaller
magnitude number has to be responded to with the right
hand and a bigger magnitude number with the left hand),
the natural spatial mapping (according to some views
because of the number location on the Mental Number
Line) has to be overcome by task instructions (Gevers
et al., 2006). Recent data show that the efficiency of
inhibition correlates with the SNARC effect (Hoffmann
et al., 2014a). It is possible that mathematicians (already
characterized by higher fluid intelligence) may also have
better inhibition and cognitive control capacities, because
not jumping to (i.e., inhibiting) premature conclusions
without proof is what their daily work is about (see
Embretson, 1995; for recent evidence on the relationship
between cognitive control, working memory, and fluid
intelligence see Chuderski, Taraday, Ne˛cka & Smolen´,
2012). According to this line of explanation, a directional
spatial-numerical mapping as indexed by the SNARC
effect may just be masked by effective cognitive control of
interference, but not be absent in mathematicians per se.
Such a cognitive control account is supported by various
related findings. First, cognitive control plays a major role
in other number processing effects (Macizo & Herrera,
2011, 2013; Huber, Moeller, Nuerk, & Willmes, 2013;
Huber, Klein, Willmes, Nuerk, & Moeller, 2014a; Huber,
Mann, Nuerk, & Moeller, 2014c; Huber, Moeller, & Nuerk,
2014d; see also Nuerk, Moeller, Klein, Willmes, & Fischer,
2011; Nuerk, Moeller, & Willmes, 2015, for overviews). It
would not be surprising if this extends to other numerical
effects such as the SNARC effect as well. Second, selective
attention has been shown to be a prerequisite for the
SNARC effect (Nuerk et al., 2005b): Even though the
magnitude of distractors was processed in an Eriksen task,
there was no SNARC effect for those distractors, only for
the targets being attended. Third, inhibition is related to
other numerical effects (Gilmore et al., 2013) and the
SNARC effect as well (Hoffmann et al., 2014a).
More abstract processing in professional mathemati-
cians This account does not refer to domain-general
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characteristics as above, but is rather related to the more
domain-specific characteristics of mathematicians. In other
words, their numerical representations might differ from
those in non-mathematicians in that they may just be more
abstract.
It has been argued that the SNARC effect is strongly
influenced by cultural and embodied experience, such as
reading direction (Shaki et al., 2009), finger counting
(Fischer, 2008; for a thorough discussion on factors influ-
encing spatial-numerical associations see also: Fischer &
Brugger, 2011; Go¨bel, Shaki, & Fischer, 2011). Possibly
mathematicians—because of their daily routine with highly
abstract concepts—have just overcome the cultural and
embodied experiences which drive our default spatial
directionality of magnitude. This could be tested in the
future by examining other instances and paradigms of
spatial-numerical association: Professional mathematicians
with neglect may neglect smaller numbers, commonly on
the left side of the number line, to a lesser extent.
More flexible spatial-numerical representations Another
related, albeit slightly different, account is that rather than
having no spatial association with numbers (because they
are abstract), mathematicians possess much more flexible
representations. In the literature, it was usually claimed that
the spatial code is automatically activated when numbers
are perceived (Fias, Lauwereyns, & Lammertyn, 2001).
Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that under particular
conditions number magnitude (in case of distracter num-
bers) can be processed semantically, but the spatial code is
not activated (Nuerk et al., 2005a, see above). So, mathe-
maticians may have strong spatial-numerical associations,
however, they may map numbers to space in a highly
flexible way. Therefore, default left-to-right mappings like
in the SNARC effect may become weaker or disappear.
This may be particularly the case in the parity judgment
task, where relating numerical magnitude to space is by no
means mandatory to accomplish the parity decision.
Mathematicians possessing more flexible representations
may simply not activate the spatial aspects that are irrele-
vant for the task demands. It is possible, however, that in a
magnitude comparison task, when spatial coding of mag-
nitude may be helpful, mathematicians also activate more
spatial-numerical associations. Here we can only conclude
that mathematicians do not activate them automatically,
when magnitude is task irrelevant. Evidence for such an
account comes from a recent unpublished study by Cohen
Kadosh and colleagues.4 They observed that mathemati-
cians are better in a number line estimation task (cf. Siegler
& Opfer, 2003) for positive numbers. So, mathematicians
may well be able to map numbers to space, but they might
do so less automatically in a default direction.
Stable but non-linear/non-horizontal numerical repre-
sentations It is also possible that a considerable proportion
of mathematicians possess relatively stable but non-linear
monotone or even non-monotone or non-horizontal spatial-
numerical representations (bent lines, circular or irregular
forms, vertical or radial associations). These representa-
tions may resemble those reported for persons with num-
ber-form synesthesia. Synesthesia may influence
elementary numerical processing (Cohen Kadosh & Henik,
2007), including the SNARC effect (Sagiv, Simner, Col-
lins, Butterworth, & Ward, 2006). This may also be the
case in mathematicians.
Embodied cognition explanation:5 It is also possible that
high math competence or arithmetic skills (characteristic of
both professionals using math in their everyday work—the
E group and mathematicians) leads to a reduced SNARC
when compared to controls. If this is correct, a smaller
SNARC effect should be found in the engineer group
compared to the control group in the present study. This is
in line with results described by Hoffmann et al. (2014a),
where a group consisting of mathematics and engineering
students revealed a significantly smaller SNARC effect
than controls.
However, an opposite effect can be expected from an
embodied cognition perspective. Possibly, the professional
work requirements of engineers relate more strongly to
spatial properties of the environments as well as a higher
propensity of motion in space. Such kinds of activity may
even enhance the spatial mapping of numerical represen-
tations. If this is correct, a stronger SNARC effect should
be found in the engineer group compared to the control
group in the present study.
If both mechanisms are operative for engineers and
influence the SNARC effect in opposite directions, they
may cancel each other out. This may lead to a null dif-
ference between engineers and controls. If the mechanisms
do not fully cancel each other out, some differences
between engineers and controls may be observed.
Nevertheless, mathematicians differ from controls. The
reason may be that they have less embodied experiences of
space-number associations, because their daily work relates
to abstract concepts. Therefore, embodiment does not lead
to enhanced space-number associations in the M group. As
a consequence, only their higher math skills may influence
the SNARC effect and may lead to a reduced effect, as
compared to controls.
4 We are grateful to Roi Cohen Kadosh, who shared information
about this yet unpublished study with us. 5 We would like to thank Martin Fischer for this suggestion.
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Limitations of the presented study6
In the present study, we did not include objective measures
of calculation skills or math expertise. Therefore, we can-
not be sure whether the M group did not differ from the
E group with respect to calculation skills. The pattern of
possible differences in arithmetic performance between the
E and the M group may be qualitatively different: engineers
may practice calculation skills more, whereas mathemati-
cians mostly focus on mental manipulations of abstract
material. Several cases of double dissociations between
mental calculation efficiency and math expertise have also
been reported (for an overview, see Pesenti, 2005). So,
while this study established that there exists a difference
between professional engineers and professional mathe-
maticians, it does not yet allow strong conclusions about
the underlying nature of this difference.
Administration of tasks aimed at measuring flexibility
and abstractness of representations would help answering
such questions regarding the nature of representations in
professional mathematicians. It would also be interesting to
include measures of cognitive inhibition in order to directly
test whether the M group outperforms other groups in this
respect and for measures of complex problem solving skills
(see Sonnleitner et al., 2013). These latter abilities seem to
be particularly important for professional mathematicians
and may also moderate spatial-numerical associations.
One must also keep in mind that the sample was not
gender matched, precluding to test for an impact of gender
on the SNARC effect. Males were reported to reveal a
stronger SNARC effect (Bull et al., 2013). However, since
the proportion of male and female participants did not
differ between groups, between-group SNARC differences
cannot be attributed to gender differences. Nevertheless,
with the current design, it was impossible to trace the
interaction effects of gender and math skills on spatial-
numerical associations. Testing this research question
would also require larger sample sizes, since gender dif-
ferences tend to be rather small. All these issues need to be
addressed in future studies.
Possible differences between the E and the C group also
deserve further investigation. Because the Bayesian anal-
yses revealed only weak evidence in favor of a null effect,
there is some probability that a between-group difference
may still exist, especially since it was shown by Bull et al.
(2013) that between-group differences in the SNARC
effect are relatively hard to detect (Cipora & Wood, 2012
for simulation data).
Conclusions
The SNARC effect disappears or is significantly reduced in
professional mathematicians and differs from control
groups, even when these controls do a lot of arithmetic in
their daily professional lives, such as engineers. A number
of domain-general accounts, like higher cognitive control
and inhibition, or domain-specific accounts, like more
abstract number processing or more flexible spatial asso-
ciations with number, may be responsible for these results.
We suggest that further exploring the reasons of why
extreme groups like mathematicians do not show a SNARC
effect and differ from normal controls can give us more
insight about the mechanisms responsible for the SNARC
effect per se. More generally, a better understanding of
how high domain expertise and long training in a particular
domain influences cognitive processes may also be infor-
mative for other cognitive domains.
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Appendix: Correlations between measures
presented for each group separately
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